The world economy [May 1987] by Ashcroft, Brian et al.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Ashcroft, Brian and Walker, Jim and Boyle, Stephen and Draper, Paul 
and Harrigan, Frank and Heeley, John and Jenkins, Iain and Lockyer, 
Cliff and Love, Jim H and McGregor, Peter and McNicolI, Iain and 
Perman, Roger and Simpson, David and Stevens, Jim (1987) The world 
economy [May 1987]. Quarterly Economic Commentary, 12 (4). pp. 4-7. 
ISSN 2046-5378 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/53231/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The World Economy 
OTERVIQf 
Growth appears to be fa l te r ing in the 
world economy due to the deflationary 
effects of the appreciation of the Yen and 
D-Mark on the Japanese and West German 
economies. Continuing trade imbalances 
and exchange rate instability reflect the 
absence of effective action to reduce the 
large US budget de f i c i t and secure a 
monetary and f i s c a l pol icy induced 
expansion in the surplus countries. 
MACROEOOKMIC TRHTOS 
In the fourth quarter of 1986, industrial 
production in the OECD countries was 
l a r g e l y unchanged over the previous 
q u a r t e r . Japanese and West German 
production continued to f a l l , by 0.4% in 
the former and by nearly 1% in the la t ter , 
while the US, and I ta ly both experienced 
positive rates of growth of 0.8% and 1.8%, 
respect ively. For the year as a whole, 
OECD production was only 1.4% higher than 
in 1985, and the change over the twelve 
months to January 1987 remained below 1%. 
The effects of the depreciating dol lar 
against the D-Mark and the Yen caused 
deflationary pressures on the West German 
and Japanese economies, l ead ing to 
indus t r ia l production changing, in the 
twelve months to January 1987, by minus 
1.6% and plus 0.4%, respectively. French 
product ion a l so f e l l , a l though for 
somewhat different reasons, by 2% over the 
period. In contras t , the US, I ta ly and 
the UK inc reased t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l 
p r o d u c t i o n by 1.6%, 2% and 1.5%, 
respectively. 
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The outlook for the US economy continues 
to be governed by uncertainty. The growth 
of real GNP slackened during 1986 to 2.5%, 
the lowest rate for four years. The 
failure of US growth in 1986 to meet 
earlier expectations - the US Government 
had been forecasting 4% growth at the 
beginning of the year - reflects several 
factors. Lower oil prices affected the 
domestic energy supply industry and 
contributed to the downturn in private 
investment from the fourth quarter of 
1985. Output in the farming sector 
remained weak, following international 
changes in the structure of agriculture; 
and import penetration increased as 
domestic demand again grew faster than 
real GNP for the sixth successive year. 
The dollar continued its fall during the 
year against the currencies of the major 
industrial countries, particularly Japan 
and West Germany. On a trade weighted 
basis, the dollar fell by 14% during 1986 
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and s u f f e r e d a f u r t h e r marked 
deter iorat ion in January of t h i s year of 
3.35. Yet, both the v i s ib le balance and 
the current account fai led to respond to 
the gain in competitive advantage, with 
the t r ade ba lance , a t a d e f i c i t of 
US$W.7bn, US$23bn worse than in 1985, 
and the current account deteriorating by a 
similar amount to US$140.6bn. 
The fa i lure of the trade and current 
accounts to improve during 1986 reflects, 
in par t , the so-called J-curve effect as 
the prices of traded goods react more 
quickly than trade volumes to exchange 
ra te changes. On th i s reasoning, the 
trade accounts should f i r s t worsen and 
then subsequently improve after currency 
depreciation. The February Commentary 
noted tha t some analysts believed tha t 
inadequate trade s ta t i s t ics were hiding an 
improvement tha t was already underway. 
Recent data provide l i t t l e support for 
th i s contention. In February, the trade 
deficit rose sharply to US$15.1bn, from a 
revised figure of US$12.3bn in January, to 
stand nearly US$3bn higher than in the 
same month in 1986. Many forecasters now 
be l i eve t h a t t he re w i l l be l i t t l e 
improvement in the trade and current 
accounts during 1987. And frustration at 
the fa i lu re of the external balance to 
improve has led to increasing pressure 
both outside and in Congress for trade 
restrictions, par t icular ly against those 
countries, such as Japan, where the US 
b i l a t e r a l d e f i c i t i s l a r g e . The 
imposi t ion by P re s iden t Reagan of a 
US$300m package of punitive import tariffs 
on Japanese electronics goods, ostensibly 
in r e t a l i a t i o n for v iola t ions by the 
Japanese semiconductor industry of the 
b i l a t e r a l agreement signed in September 
last year, can be viewed as an ill-judged 
response to these demands. 
The principal reason for the fa i lure of 
the US trade imbalance to adjust so far to 
dollar depreciation i s the continuing 
domestic savings shor t fa l l (see November 
and February Commentaries). The shortage 
of savings i s the outcome of extreme 
f iscal imbalance as the large federal 
budget deficit , US$220.7bn in fiscal year 
1986, increased the demand for savings 
while o ther savings in the domestic 
economy actual ly f e l l . The inevi table 
outcome has been a substant ia l inflow of 
foreign capi ta l to finance the budget 
de f ic i t which i s mirrored in the def ic i t 
on current account. Attempts are being 
made to reduce the budget deficit, notably 
due to the requirements of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollins budget reform law, but the 
projections for fiscal years 1987 and 1988 
of US$173.2bn and US$107.8bn, a r e 
considered by many analysts to be based on 
a mixture of creative accounting and over-
optimistic assumptions about US growth. 
In the f i r s t quarter of 1987, the US 
economy grew a t a real annual ra te of 
4.3%, d e s p i t e the index of leading 
economic indicators in January showing the 
biggest decline for two and a half years. 
Both the decline in the leading economic 
indicators and the r e su l t s for f i r s t 
qua r t e r growth, r e f l e c t sho r t - t e rm 
factors , such as the growth of stock-
building in the f i r s t quarter following 
de-stocking in the f inal quarter of l a s t 
year . The general expectation would 
appear to be that rea l GNP growth in 1987 
wi l l be l i t t l e different from 1986 and 
probably in the range of 2.5% to 3%. And 
this view depends on a modest recovery in 
consumer spending which has declined in 
s u c c e s s i v e q u a r t e r s , and a slow 
improvement in the trade de f i c i t . The 
economy remains vulnerable, however, to 
the possibility of a further deterioration 
in the trading r e l a t ions between the US 
and Japan, and to i n s t a b i l i t y in the US 
and Japanese financial markets. This 
l a t t e r prospect has increased as fears 
about the US inf la t ion ra te grow. In the 
f i r s t few months of 1987, consumer price 
inf la t ion in the US was running at an 
annual rate just below 5%. The firming of 
the oi l price and r is ing import prices, 
following the depreciation of the dollar, 
are expected to push the inflation rate up 
from 1.9% in 1986 to over 3% in the 
current year, but this forecast will have 
to be revised if the dollar experiences a 
further depreciation during the year. 
The performance of the Japanese economy 
r e m a i n s s t r o n g l y a f f e c t e d by t h e 
d e f l a t i o n a r y e f f e c t s of the massive 
app rec i a t i on of the Yen aga ins t the 
dol lar , which by the end of April had 
risen by 86% since January 1985. Real GNP 
rose by 0.8% in the final quarter of 1986, 
resul t ing in a 2.5% increase over the 
year, considerably l e s s than the 4.7% 
growth achieved in 1985. As noted at the 
beginning of t h i s survey, Japanese 
industrial production rose by 0.4% in the 
t w e l v e months to J a n u a r y , w h i l e 
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manufacturing output increased by 0.5? 
over the same period. Lower energy prices 
and the appreciation of the Yen have, 
however, provided cost reductions to non-
exporting sectors which probably accounts 
for the economy s t i l l exper iencing 
p o s i t i v e growth, a l l be i t low by 
h i s to r i ca l standards. Producer prices 
f e l l by 6.4% in the year to January, 
although consumer prices fel l by only 1%, 
suggesting that companies have been slow 
to pass on the benefi ts of fa l l ing costs 
to the domestic consumer. This may in 
part be due to Japanese firms seeking to 
increase p ro f i t s on domestic sales to 
offset reduced prof i t margins in the US 
market, following attempts to l i m i t the 
d o l l a r p r i c e e f f e c t s of the Yen's 
appreciation on the i r market share. In 
1986, Japan's exports declined in volume 
terms while imports increased, by 1.3% and 
12.5%, r e s p e c t i v e l y . However, these 
volume changes were small compared with 
the extent of the Yen's appreciation. In 
consequence, the su rp lus on cu r ren t 
account rose progressively throughout the 
year to US£25.8bn in the f ina l quarter , 
producing a record overal l surplus of 
US$86bn for the year. 
Pressures on the Japanese Government to 
stimulate the growth of domestic demand, 
and so encourage imports from the US in 
pa r t i cu la r , have continued. The meeting 
in Paris in February of the G6 finance 
ministers produced the following agreement 
to s t a b i l i s e currency l eve l s : to monitor 
key domestic indica tors ; and use macro-
ecoomic policies to promote more balance 
world growth. The failure of central bank 
intervention to prevent subsequent dollar 
depreciation and the i nab i l i t y of Mr 
Nakasone's Government to gain approval in 
parliament for i t s tax reform package, 
e x a c e r b a t e d t h e a l r e a d y - g r e a t 
protectionist pressures in the US. There 
appears l i t t l e hope in the coming months 
of a monetary or f i s c a l s t imu lus of 
sufficient size to have much impact on the 
record trade surplus. 
In West Germany, real GNP expanded by 2.4% 
during 1986, nearly 1% point lower than 
the government's ta rge t of 3-3.5%. After 
output had actually declined in the f i rs t 
quarter of this year, the Spring report of 
West Germany's f ive l ead ing economic 
research inst i tutes predicted lower growth 
on present po l ic ies in 1987, with two of 
the inst i tutes forecasting GNP growth to 
be no more than 1%. IMF forecasts are 
also pess imis t ic about German economic 
growth this year, suggesting that growth 
i s l ike ly to be no more than 2%. The 
pr inciple const ra in t on performance has 
been the d e f l a t i o n a r y impact of the 
appreciation of the D-Mark against the 
dol lar and other key currencies stuch as 
s t e r l i n g . As in Japan, the J -curve 
effects of the appreciation, coupled with 
the effects of lower oi l prices on the 
import b i l l , increased the current account 
surplus in 1986 to DM77.8bn, compared 
with DM38.9bn in 1985. Current forecasts 
suggest t ha t increasing import volumes 
wi l l reduce the surplus in 1987 but only 
to between DM65bn and DM58bn. 
Consumer price indices 
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Following the Paris accord in February, 
the German Government has taken some steps 
to s t imulate the domestic economy. The 
3%-6% money supply growth ta rge t appears 
to have been downgraded somewhat in 
importance, with greater a t tent ion being 
given to s t ab i l i s i ng the exchange r a t e . 
The discount ra te was cut by 0.5% points 
to 3% in January, although there has been 
res is tance to further i n t e r e s t ra te cuts 
because of fears that they might add to 
inf la t ion which, in terms of the GDP 
deflator , i s currently running a t an 
annual r a t e of 2.5%. Extra tax cuts of 
DM5bn have now been scheduled on top of 
the DM10bn reductions already planned to 
take effect in January 1988. Yet, to many 
observers, the growth of the West German 
economy w i l l remain below i t s non-
inflat ionary potent ia l un t i l a further 
policy stimulus is given to the economy. 
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LABOUR MARKET 
Standardised rates of uneaployaent have 
not been published by the OECD for the 
fourth quarter of 1986 for the aggregate 
of member countries, because the series i s 
no longer being updated pending receipt of 
new data based on EEC Labour Force 
Surveys. However, on the basis of data 
that i s avai lable for key countries i t 
seems l i k e l y t h a t unemployment f e l l 
s l ight ly during th i s period. The US 
standardised unemployment ra te remained 
unchanged a t 6.8%. Japan's unemployment 
ra te f e l l by one tenth of a percent point 
to 2.8%, but increased s l igh t ly to 3% in 
January of t h i s year. Unemployment in 
France continued a t 10.6%, r i s ing to 11% 
by February, and the UK ra t e also reduced 
from 11.6% to 11.3%, fa l l ing further to 
11.1% by February. The balance of the 
remaining c o u n t r i e s r e p o r t i n g , a l so 
exhibited a s l igh t decline during the 
period, but rates in Europe in particular 
are s t i l l generally well above those 
reported in other areas of the OECD. 
PROGNOSIS 
Growth appears to be fa l te r ing in the 
world economy and the main reason for the 
sluggish prospects i s undoubtedly the 
effect of the appreciation of the D-Mark 
and the Yen against the dol lar . With the 
West German and the Japanese economies now 
growing more slowly than the US economy, 
l i t t l e change can be expected in the 
current account surpluses in West Germany 
and Japan and in the corresponding US 
deficit over the coming months. 
Despite the currency s t a b i l i s a t i o n 
agreement concluded by the G6 finance 
ministers in Paris in February, the dollar 
suffered further depreciation even in the 
face of s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r v e n t i o n to 
support the dol lar by the main central 
banks. Further depreciation remains a 
p o s s i b i l i t y . And the impercep t ib l e 
improvement in the US current account 
implies tha t further US pro tec t ion is t 
measures against Japan, and poss ib le 
retaliation, are an ever-present threat. 
The policy stance of the US Government, 
Congress and several European governments 
towards the imbalances in the world 
economy leaves much to be desired. The 
focus, largely in the US, on the evident 
t a r i f f and n o n - t a r i f f bar r ie rs which 
r e s t r i c t sales in par t icular sectors to 
the Japanese economy is mistaken, if i t is 
believed that such trade imperfections 
account for the level and persistence of 
the US's current account deficit. Nor can 
the large b i l a t e r a l def ici ts experienced 
by the US and other European countries 
w i th t h e J a p a n e s e be t aken as a 
j u s t i f i c a t i on for r e t a l i a to ry measures 
against that country. The principle of 
e f f i c i e n t t r a d e on the b a s i s of 
comparative advantage i s pe r f ec t ly 
consistent with b i l a t e r a l de f i c i t s and 
surpluses with particular countries. The 
overall deficit or surplus experienced by 
a country i s , rather, a macroeconomic and 
not a macroeconomic phenomenon. Moreover, 
the p r e s e n t l a r g e t r ade imbalances 
experienced by the US, West Germany and 
Japan can more properly be ascribed to a 
fiscal rather than a monetary cause. That 
i s , the pr inciple explanation of the 
imbalances l i e s not in exchange ra te 
disequilibria but in the fiscal imbalance 
in the US, due to the large budget deficit 
producing a savings shor t fa l l which has 
been financed by capi tal inflows from 
abroad, and principal ly from Japan. The 
engineering of a large appreciation of the 
Yen, on the one hand, and the depreciaiton 
of the dol lar , on the other, has clearly 
produced an exchange rate alignment which 
doe not reflect purchasing power parities, 
and in the absence of other policy action 
i s l ike ly to prove damaging to world 
economic growth while doing l i t t l e , in the 
short run a t l e a s t , to improve the trade 
imbalance. 
In the February Commentary we argued that 
a currency ag reement be tween the 
principals, coupled with a commitment to 
domestic expansion by the surp lus 
countries and a more rapid contraction of 
the US budget deficit, continues to be the 
most pressing requirement in the world 
economy over the coming months. The end 
of February saw the rea l i sa t ion of a 
stabilisation agreement in the form of the 
Paris accord, but subsequent events have 
shown that without a serious attempt to 
implement the commitment to expansion in 
the surplus countries and the contraction 
of the budget de f i c i t in the US, the goal 
of exchange rate stability i s illusory. 
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